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‘Throughout history it has been the inaction of those who could 
have acted, the indifference of those who should have known 
better, the silence of the voice of justice, that has made it possible 
for evil to triumph.’ - Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. 
1. Introduction 
Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) implicitly recognises the 
validity of the concept of non-intervention, when it articulates ‘nothing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorise the [UN] to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.1  This principle has been 
designed to reassure member states of the UN that their sovereign rights are 
respected, and that they should never become targets of intervention.2  If this is 
indeed the case, why then bother with the notion of intervention?   
Considering the anticipation of an era characterised by international peace, 
security, and co-operation at the end of the Cold War, high expectations appear to 
have instead given way to disorder and disillusionment as a result of the intensifying 
conflicts that have arisen from human catastrophes in economically and politically 
disadvantaged countries in many parts of the world.  In Africa’s case, it appears that 
the more intense and destructive the conflict, as in the case of Burundi, Liberia, 
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1  UN, The Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.  The Charter of the United Nations 
may be found in the United Nation official website at 
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2  R. Falk, ‘The new interventionism and the Third World’, Current History, 98/631 
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Rwanda, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) exemplify, the 
greater is the paralysis of the international community in acting decisively to bring 
an end to the violence.   
Moreover, the role of the classical peacekeeper – to monitor the 
implementation of an agreement between two or more parties to a conflict, and to do 
so usually unarmed – often seems to be ‘the exception rather than the rule’.3   In 
reality, conflicts in Africa (and other parts of the world), often fuelled by deep-
rooted hatred and involving countless armed factions, as well as the abundance and 
availability of weapons and ammunition, confront peace forces with a highly 
constrained and unsafe operational environment.  Beyond this, the role of the UN in 
this ‘new world disorder’ has been unclear, particularly in its responsibility to 
mobilise the political will or the capabilities to address internal problems in so-
called weak states. 
Against this backdrop, humanitarian intervention may emerge as one 
amongst other fundamental issues that, if conducted in a legitimate or, at least 
coherent way, could positively contribute to the management and perhaps the 
resolution of violence on the African continent.   
The central argument of this paper attempts to demonstrate that, should any 
government be guilty of the most heinous crimes recognised under international law 
(genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression), states, 
regional organisations and the international community have a moral responsibility 
to intervene in such extreme cases.  In Africa’s case, intervening for humanitarian 
purposes is of special significance since the level of human suffering on the 
continent is distinctly high.  In this regard, the study highlights Africa’s recent 
commitment of overturning its traditional posture of non-intervention in the affairs 
of states, particularly those governments guilty of violating serious international law 
crimes. 
2. The difficulty in defining and accepting the notion of humanitarian 
intervention  
Because the term ‘intervention’ has been used in so many contexts, from 
interference to meddling to forcible intervention, often there is confusion as to its 
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meaning or definition.4 A definition of ‘humanitarian intervention’ that might find 
little disagreement is proposed by deLisle, inasmuch as he defines it as 
the use or threat of force by a state or states in order to alter 
institutional structures, or practices inside a target state in such a 
way as to stop or prevent severe human rights law violations or 
humanitarian law violations.5 
Often, confusion exists between what is meant by human rights law and 
humanitarian law, so it would be useful to clarify the difference between the two 
before the discussion continues.  In brief, international humanitarian law, encoded in 
the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977, governs 
the waging of war and the treatment of combatants and civilians in time of war as 
stipulated.  Human rights law, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with 
relations between states and their nationals in times of peace.  Serious violations of 
human rights law include the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes.  These crimes are defined in relative detail in the recently ratified Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.6  What human rights law and 
humanitarian law have in common is that they are both concerned with upholding 
and defending the status and rights of the individual.    
Like most other definitions of intervention, a major problem with the 
concept of humanitarian intervention is that its use runs counter to the traditional 
norm of not intervening in the internal affairs of other states.  Humanitarian grounds 
for intervening complicate matters even more as they not only entail an exception to 
the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation state but they clearly evoke the 
protection of human rights and humanitarian laws.  There can be little doubt that the 
trend after the Second World War has been towards a stronger recognition and need 
to upgrade the status of human beings in international law.  Up until 1945, the 
practice of international law was almost exclusively concerned with relations 
between states.  Today, however, it is commonly asserted that the role of the state in 
the international system has shifted somewhat and has been subject to a process of 
reinterpretation (and hence undermined state-centred thinking) in the humanitarian 
and human rights fields.   
                                                 
4  A. du Plessis, ‘Military intervention: nature and scope’, in L. Du Plessis and M. 
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At a more general level, the various processes of globalisation have also had 
a positive effect in promoting certain values that have been considered to be 
incompatible with the more traditional state-centric approach.  Amongst other 
things, these values include limiting the role of the government and promoting good 
governance, democracy and human rights.  
Altogether, these developments have made humanitarian intervention more 
immediately relevant, and, of course, more controversial.  At the heart of the 
humanitarian intervention debate lies the question of whether force can be used 
lawfully in situations other than those foreseen by the UN Charter.  In order to 
clarify the legal dimensions of humanitarian intervention the next section will briefly 
concentrate solely on the international law aspects of what is usually referred to in 
international law parlance as ‘intervention’. 
3. Intervention and international law 
Since a state’s right to sovereignty (i.e. its territorial integrity and political 
independence) is paramount in international law, any type or form of intervention is 
forbidden.7  The theory of sovereignty implies that a state cannot be ruled from an 
external source, but that the main decisions about its actions must come from within 
it.8  The UN Charter also contains a general prohibition on the use of foreign 
forcible intervention.  Should intervention involve armed forces, Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter explicitly prohibits the ‘threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity, or political independence of a state in any manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the UN’.9 In other words, intervention which international law outlaws 
is intervention by (military) force.  
However, despite international legal principles forbidding states to intervene 
directly or indirectly in the internal and external affairs of other states, there are 
numerous examples in recent history of states doing just the opposite;  the pace of 
interventions has, if anything, picked up in the last few decades.10  Since the 1980s, 
the United States of America (US) alone has been involved in at least twelve 
military interventions – most notably in Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama 
(1989), the Persian Gulf War (1990/1), Somalia (1992/3), Haiti (1993), and the 
former Yugoslavia (1993-1999). 
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The UN Charter allows for only two exceptions to the rule of non-
intervention: one is in response to an armed attack (Article 51); the other is when the 
use of force is authorised by the UN Security Council to maintain or restore 
international peace and security (Article 42).11  Barrie outlines further reasons that 
have been accepted traditionally by international law as giving states, regional 
organisations, and/or international organisations justification for intervening in the 
affairs of another state.  They are: a state’s right to protect its citizens abroad; to 
assist peoples in their right to self-determination; as a result of a state formally 
consenting another party to intervene; and humanitarian intervention.12    
The last reason, in particular, has been a controversial issue because those 
who defend humanitarian intervention, commonly regard it as a right ‘that comes 
into being when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its 
nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental rights’.13  The central argument 
here is that the interests of humanity in these circumstances outweighs the 
prohibition on intervention.  These circumstances are generally considered as 
morally unacceptable acts that, in some way or the other, affect all states in the 
international system.  Despite this, unauthorised and/or unilateral intervention poses 
problems for most states. 
Apart from the (well-merited) fear that the US and her allies may abuse the 
right to interfere in the affairs of other states, the absence of a legal framework for 
carrying out interventions contributes to the unease states experience when 
considering such actions. The current system, whereby force is only authorised by 
the UN Security Council, unfortunately appears to be an insufficient warranty that 
the Council will intervene when the next human atrocity occurs.   
Related to this, historical analysis suggests that economic sanctions and (to a 
lesser extent) the threat of criminal prosecution are by enlarge weak deterrents and 
even weaker instruments of compellence.14  Specifically, the assumption that 
economic measures are necessarily the more humane approach to end inhuman 
treatment by government leaders has been severely undermined by claims that 
                                                 
11  C. Oudraat, ‘Humanitarian intervention: the lessons learned’, Current History, 99/641 
(December 2000), p 421. 
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13  G. Barrie, ‘International law and forcible intervention: a millennium assessment’, in  
L. Du Plessis and M. Hough, Managing Africa’s conflicts: the challenge of military 
intervention, HSRC: Pretoria (2000), p 81. 
14  Oudraat, op cit., p 422. 
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economic sanctions fall disproportionately on the population rather than the 
leadership.15 
Considering the broad overview of the legal dimensions of intervention, the 
discussion in the subsequent section will review how certain factors in the post-Cold 
War era may favour intervention as a possible course of action in ending 
humanitarian crisis in conflict ridden regions such as Africa. 
4. Factors inducing humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era 
Vertzberger16 suggests that intervention decisions mainly depend on the 
nature of a specific international system.  Thus, different systems have distinct rules 
regarding the tolerance for the use of forcible intervention as an instrument of 
foreign policy.  Bearing in mind Vertzberger’s reasoning, and that intervention is 
neither a new phenomenon, nor tied to any particular international system, an 
overview is given of specific attributes of the post-Cold War era and its outcomes 
with regards to the use of intervention as a viable tool to alleviate human suffering. 
4.1 The ‘myth of sovereignty' 
 It is often suggested that the post-Cold War political era is characterised by 
the dissolution of traditional boundaries17 and the relative weakening of the nation-
state.18  As a result of these alleged developments, a number of scholars19 have 
suggested that the concept of sovereignty has become a relative one.   As mentioned 
previously, the legal doctrine of sovereignty stresses a government should be in 
control of both its own behaviour and affairs.  This implies that, in order to enjoy 
sovereignty, governments must also enjoy legitimacy i.e. the belief that a 
government has a right to exercise political authority over the rest of its cotizens.20  
Yet, consider some of the more challenging characteristics of the international 
system: the increasing marginalisation of the South; the exacerbation of the internal 
weaknesses of many developing countries; the prevalence of regional conflicts and 
                                                 
15  J. Baylis et al (ed), Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to Strategic 
Studies, Oxford University Press: Oxford (2002), p 57. 
16  E.I. Vertzberger, ‘International milieu and foreign military intervention: when and 
how much does the milieu matter?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 17/3 (September 
1994), p 142. 
17  J. Richardson, ‘Strategic thinking in an era of intervention’, Comparative Strategy, 
18/1 (March 1999), p 32. 
18  Malan, op cit., pp 32-33. 
19  See for example S. Strange, The retreat of the state – the diffusion of power in the 
world economy, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge (1996), xvii + 199 pp. 
20  A. Thomson, An introduction to African politics, Routledge: London (2000), p 99. 
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internal war, enhanced by the resurgence of ethnic nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism.21  
Surely those states, when confronted with international indignation over 
human rights law and humanitarian law violations, have lost their right to invoke the 
principle of sovereignty?  And those governments, which have lost control over their 
armed forces to massacre civilians, have surely lost their legitimacy, in the eyes of 
their people, as well as those of the international community?22  
Cilliers and Sturman conceptualise this problem as the ‘myth of 
sovereignty’, a term used to underline the fact that a number of African states do not 
have the power, authority or competence to govern their own territory.23  It is 
suggested that the absence, or gradual disappearance, of a functioning government 
can lead to the same kind of human catastrophe as the presence of a repressive state.  
In considering the emergence of human rights and humanitarian law – both seen as 
fundamental tools in improving the status of the individual under international law 
since 1945 – scholars such as Wheeler content that there is an emergent norm in 
international society that governments that commit the most serious crimes under 
international law should forfeit the protection afforded them by the rules of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.24  
In practice, the UN has frequently been unable to produce consensus among 
its members to act, and to infringe on the sovereign rights, against governments 
culpable of committing mass human atrocities.  The fact that UN action appears to 
be mainly driven by the interests of its more powerful members, as the tragic events 
in Rwanda in 1994 testify, have certainly contributed to the accusation that the 
organisation appears sometimes unwilling to act.   
Despite this, specific events in the 1990s appear to have enlarged consensus 
about the justification for humanitarian claims,25 and may have raised new 
expectations of a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisations’ (NATO) Balkan interventions in the mid-1990s,26 for 
                                                 
21  A. du Plessis, ‘Military intervention’, op cit., p 18. 
22  Malan, op cit., p 33. 
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African Union’, African Security Review, 11/3 (August 2002), p 31. 
24  N.J. Wheeler, ‘Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo’, International Affairs, 77/1 
(January 2001), p 127. 
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example D.H. Allin, ‘NATO’s Balkan interventions’, Adelphi Paper, 347 (2002), 112 
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example, demonstrated the readiness of certain countries to undertake humanitarian 
interventions.  
On the whole, therefore, it appears that the incentives for humanitarian 
intervention, specifically driven by domestic political imperatives, are likely to be 
more prominent as the pillars of the Westphalian system of state sovereignty appear 
to be decaying, while the emphasis on defending human rights and humanitarian 
laws of war seem to be gaining ground.27  In order to prevent, manage or resolve 
conflicts that may involve mass human atrocities, it becomes necessary to 
understand their origin.  Hence, some explanation of conflict, particularly in the case 
of Africa, will be examined in the following section.    
4.2 The nature of conflict 
 Kofi Annan noted in his 1998 report on The causes of conflict and the 
promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa28 that the causes 
of African conflicts are multifaceted and included historical, external, and internal 
factors. In this regard, some African commentators and leaders have looked at 
conflict ‘from the prisms of the continent’s colonial past’29 and the effects of the 
Cold War in shaping the African state system. Crises of legitimacy, a lack of 
political accommodation, and the existence of weak states appear to be other major 
factors contributing to African conflicts. 
Colonialism is commonly blamed for creating the conditions for many ethnic 
grievances of the post-independence era, particularly through arbitrarily drawn 
colonial boundaries. Indeed, unresolved disputes concerning inherited colonial 
borders resulted in post-independence conflicts between Burkina Faso and Mali, 
Nigeria and Cameroon, and Morocco and Algeria.  Irredentism claims have been 
made by Morocco in Western Sahara, Somalia in Ethiopia, and Libya in Chad.30 At 
independence, the new African leadership inherited a country with a political system 
based on an order that they opposed little or no resources or even the adequate 
means to acquire them, high illiteracy rates, and poor social and economic 
infrastructures.  Worst of all, conflict in the post-colonial state can be attributed to 
the fact that many governments have been unable to sustain ethnic unity or provide 
new incentives for the nations or tribes to live together. 
                                                 
27  Vertzberger, op cit., p 153. 
28  K.A. Annan, The causes of conflict and the promotion of 
durable peace and development in Africa, 
http://www.un.org.ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html, April 1998. 
29  A. Adebajo and C. Landsberg, ‘Pax Africana in the Age of Extremes’, The South 
African Journal of International Affairs, 8/2 (2000), p 12. 
30  Ibid. 
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The Cold War affected the African state-system by prolonging conflict,31 and 
skewed the nature of peace and security as it encouraged the division of the 
continent into pro-Western and pro-Marxist client-states.32  During the Cold War, 
aid flows were high because the major powers were motivated to ensure the 
continuing support of their clients.  But there was a cost.33  Where conflict did erupt, 
the African continent was inevitably flooded with arms which allowed strong 
centralised government to enforce their authority through large standing armies.34   
At the end of the Cold War, there appears to have been little effective 
demobilisation in Africa.  Today, the remnants of large armies still remain in the 
continent, contributing to new areas of conflict or sustaining factional irregular 
armed groups which threaten both domestic stability and security.35  In this context, 
the conception of security has largely been promoted in mainly militaristic terms 
which, in turn, has driven states and governments away from focusing on the needs 
of peoples. Instead, governments have promoted the concept of security through 
narrowly defined (military) national security interests, and as a result the security of 
citizens has often been overlooked and neglected.36 
As such, a number of Africa’s post-independence leaders, notably through 
their brutal power struggles and politics of social exclusion, have also contributed to 
conflicts on the continent.37  This explanation is often referred to as the ‘crises of 
governance’ facing Africa.38  The African state became a highly contested arena, 
and spawned an era of personalised rule.  The centralisation of state power by 
autocrats preserved their own rule but eventually led, in cases like Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Zaïre and Somalia, to injustices that perpetuated the very conflicts they claimed to 
be attempting to avoid.39 These predatory governments, operating through coercion, 
corruption and personality politics to secure political power and control of 
resources,40 are largely responsible for what is often referred to as the ‘collapse’ or 
the ‘disintegration’ of state institutions. Generally speaking, then, the concept of a 
                                                 
31  Ibid. 
32  I.A. Gambari, 'Africa and the United Nations in the 21st Century: challenges and 
prospects', paper presented at the Africa Centre, London, 7 February 2001, 
http://www.Africacentre.org.uk/UNGambari.htm. 
33  Anon, ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’, Foreign and Commonwealth Department for 
International Development and the Ministry of Defence Consultation Document, 
(March 2001), pp 7-8. 
34  Adebajo and Landsberg, op cit., p 13. 
35  Anon, ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’, op cit., p 8. 
36  Gambari, 'Africa and the United Nations in the 21st Century', op cit. 
37  Adebajo and Landsberg, op cit., p 14. 
38  Gambari, 'Africa and the United  Nations in the 21st Century', op cit. 
39  Adebajo and Landsberg, op cit., p 14. 
40  Anon, ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’, op cit., p 13. 
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‘nation-state’ in the Western sense is often difficult to envisage within the 
boundaries of these countries.  
Lacking political legitimacy and political compromise, often no concept of 
nationality exists, communal and tribal loyalties still form the central core of the 
society, and the visible symbols of national identity are both few and unimportant.41  
Although there are examples in Africa of capable and effective governments, like 
Botswana and Mauritius, the other end of the spectrum has witnessed more cases 
where governance has disintegrated into protracted civil wars and lawlessness.  
These states include Angola (since 1975), Burundi (since 1993), the DRC (since 
1997), Guinea-Bissau (1997-99), Côte d’Ivoire (since 2002) Liberia (since 1989), 
Sierra Leone (1992-99), Somalia (since 1991), and Sudan (since 1983).  In most 
cases, large slices of states bordering these countries have suffered the spillover 
effects of conflict.42 
The trend of internal crises, exacerbated by intra-state wars, will most likely 
continue well into the future because civil and mixed conflicts, involving sub-state 
groups fighting for political, economic, social and individual reasons, where national 
governments are unable to govern their territories effectively, is expected to be the 
norm.  As a result, the international community will continue to be characterised by 
a predominantly peaceful centre (the Developed World) and a peripheral area (the 
Developing World), distinguished by high levels of persistent civil strife, ethnic 
nationalism, resource scarcity and a demand for raw material, and religious 
fundamentalism. The potential for conflict in the periphery is also expected to be 
much higher, owing to the declining ability and willingness of the UN to secure the 
international order.43  
In considering the relationship between humanitarian intervention and the 
patterns and sources of conflict in Africa, one important factor stands out: the very 
nature of expected conflict may favour intervention as a preventive response.  
Indeed, Solomon suggests that conflict on the African continent is often ‘resistant’ to 
negotiation.44  It is argued that the ‘negotiation process functions best under 
conditions of equality, where all parties have some form of veto over the outcome’.45  
                                                 
41  A.A. Said, C.O. Lerche Jr, and C.O. Lerche III, Concepts of international politics in 
global perspective, 4th Ed, Prentice Hall: New Jersey (1995), p 35. 
42  A. Gelb, Can Africa claim the 21st Century?, World Bank Publications (April 2000), 
pp 54-55. 
43  A. du Plessis, ‘Military intervention’, op cit., pp 23-24. 
44  H. Solomon, ‘South African foreign policy, preventive diplomacy and the false 
promise of conflict resolution’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 9/2 
(Winter 2002), p 153. 
45  Ibid. 
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Because these conditions do not always exist in Africa, conflicts on the continent 
and their root causes create the typical conditions under which the use of 
intervention can (and should) be considered and justified particularly along 
humanitarian lines.46   
Although the desire to postpone armed intervention is understandable, in 
situations of extreme human suffering, it can also be ill advised.  For example, Haass 
explains that military action by NATO forces against the Serbs around Sarajevo in 
February 1994 led many observers to argue that force should have been introduced 
earlier to spare Bosnia’s Muslims much of their misery.47  In this case, it is 
suggested that the passage of time increased the amount of territory held by the 
Serbs, the human suffering, and ‘the bitterness that makes any sort of reconciliation 
highly unlikely’.48   
4.3 Emerging ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations have often been regarded as an ‘enemy’49 of the ruling 
norms and principles of international relations.  In fact, with reference to 
humanitarian intervention, ethical concerns are a primary source of justification for 
the intervenient use of military force. From a moral standing, Wheeler notes that to 
qualify as a legitimate humanitarian intervention there has to be a legitimate 
humanitarian emergency ‘where the level of human rights abuses shocks the moral 
conscience of humanity [and where there is] a strong believe that the intervention 
will produce a positive humanitarian outcome’.50 A second threshold criterion is 
proposed by Garrett who concludes that ‘humanitarian outcomes are more important 
than motives’.51  In other words, unauthorised intervention by a state with no 
humanitarian motives may be preferable to inaction if this genocide and mass 
murder. 
A good example of international inaction is Rwanda.  Although more than a 
half-a-million people were butchered in genocidal slaughter by rival tribal tribes in 
the country between 1993-1994, it is frequently alleged that the West did not 
intervene because there were no significant (Western) national interests at stake.  
Needles to say, the failure to prevent and end genocides is perhaps the most 
                                                 
46  A. du Plessis ‘Military intervention’, op cit., p 24. 
47  Haass, op cit., p 90. 
48  Ibid. 
49  A. du Plessis, ‘Military intervention’, op cit., p 24. 
50  Wheeler, op cit., pp 122-123. 
51  G.A. Garret, Doing good and doing well: an examination of humanitarian 
intervention, Praeger: Westport (1999), p 120. 
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appalling example of Western inaction in the 1990s.52  Moreover, it appears that the 
UN had knowledge that a genocide was being planned and executed, but this 
information seems to have been (perhaps willingly) lost within its complex 
bureaucratic structures.53   Thus, the response to a particular crisis seems to have 
depended mainly upon the interest and will of one or more of the great powers and 
the inability of the UN to act decisively.  Arguably, this trend is likely to continue.  
At the same time, a failed intervention can do as much damage as failing to 
intervene at all.54 The Somalian disaster showed that an inappropriate response to 
complex emergency situation can lead a situation from bad to worse.55  The ad hoc 
and sometimes seemingly arbitrary nature of the interventions that have taken place 
in the past has given many governments cause for concern, and the stakes in the 
intervention debate are therefore extremely high, especially for Africa.  On one 
hand, many lives can be saved. On the other hand, there is the real danger that 
poorly planned and executed interventions will do more harm than good, while at 
the same time weakening the norm of non-intervention and the credibility of the 
UN.56  However, in order to prevent such human catastrophe in the near future, it 
could be argued that the ethical context should come into play as a necessary 
condition for the reversal of (negative) perceptions regarding the usefulness of 
intervention in contemporary world politics.57    
By taking into account how systemic imperatives, the nature of conflict and 
moral dilemmas have favoured intervention as a possible, and often preferable, 
course of action in ending humanitarian-related crises, a fresh dynamism and 
innovation to the process of preventing and managing conflicts in Africa is 
required.58  Perhaps the most workable system in dealing with conflicts is to place 
more emphasis and reliance on regional organisations. 
                                                 
52  Wheeler, op cit., p 126. 
53  V. Seymour, Burundi and the future of humanitarian intervention, ISS Occasional 
Paper No 9 (September 1996), p 3. 
54  Cilliers and Sturman, op cit., p 29. 
55  Ibid. 
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African Security Review, 11/1 (2002), p 74. 
57  Cilliers and Sturman, op cit., p 25. 
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5. The necessity to become more self-reliant: enter African regionalism  
Rather than the UN’s envisioned involvement in                          
peace missions,59 it is widely acknowledged, and also well recognised by most 
leaders of less powerful states, that the more powerful members of the UN are eager 
to delegate responsibility for peace missions on to (sub) regional bodies such as, in 
Africa’s case, the African Union (AU), the South African Development Community 
(SADC), and ECOWAS.60  Factors that have influenced the decline of international 
commitment in conflict management, and resolution in Africa, and hence the 
growing reliance on ‘regionalisation’, appear to be twofold.   
The first factor relates to the apparent strategic marginalisation of the 
continent.  The strategic importance the Cold War accorded Africa has, for the most 
part, declined.  This loss of strategic value has dramatically affected the stability of 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Whereas both Moscow and Washington had once worked hard 
to keep particular governments in firm control, the incentives to do so in the post-
Cold War years have evaporated.61  Secondly, negative experiences with peace 
missions in chaotic sub-Saharan conditions have generally convinced Western 
powers that such operations may not be in their national interests. Since the ill-fated 
intervention in the inter-clan conflicts in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, even the US 
(with its long history of intervening in the affairs of other states) has become 
cautious about becoming involved in African conflicts.62  
These two factors have largely influenced Western approaches in solving 
African conflicts. In essence, this approach appears to be centred on resolving 
conflicts through political dialogue and negotiations, rather than through any kind of 
military action.   
What has made matters even worse for Africa, is that the UN has generally 
proven unable to meet the high expectations in the field of peace missions in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
The [UN] does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional 
capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under Chapter 
                                                 
59  The UN uses the expression ‘peace mission’ as a generic term to include all political, 
diplomatic and military activities related to multinational events to prevent manage 
and settle disputes in terms of the UN Charter, including humanitarian intervention 
operations. 
60  Cilliers and Sturman, op cit., p 31. 
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62  L. du Plessis, ‘African conflict at the turn of the century: manifestations, propensity 
and management’, in L. Du Plessis and M. Hough, Managing Africa’s conflicts: the 
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VII of the Charter [and the UN] still lacks the capacity to 
implement rapidly and effectively decisions of the Security Council 
calling for the dispatch of peacekeeping operations in crisis 
situations. [Moreover,] peacemaking and human rights operations 
[also] lack a secure financial footing, which has a serious impact on 
the viability of such operations.63  
This line of thought is also captured by Neethling who argues that the UN 
has proven unable to deploy robust forces that are capable of conducting peace 
enforcement operations in brutal conflicts.64  Besides the UN’s experiences in 
Somalia and Rwanda, its endeavours in Liberia, the DRC and Sierra Leone have 
further proven that the UN does not appear in a position to respond meaningfully to 
humanitarian emergencies in Africa.  More seriously, Mulikita argues that there has 
been a perception often aired by African leaders that the UN upholds a double 
standard when it deals with peace and security challenges in Africa.65  Likewise, in 
her keynote address to an international symposium on conflict prevention, organised 
by the Government of Japan and held in Tokyo in March 2000, South Africa’s 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr Dlamini-Zuma cautioned:  
We have observed over the years that sometimes when the UN is 
called upon to act in Africa, it approaches that responsibility with 
the speed of an elephant whereas when it is asked to act in other 
situations it approaches at the speed of a cheetah.66   
Therefore, with reference to the proposed indifference of the UN, and in a 
world within which African security is of marginal global concern, as well as at a 
time when the UN and many Western powers have became increasingly unwilling 
and/or unable to be involved in regional conflicts, many African nations have 
realised the necessity to become more self-reliant in responding to armed conflict 
and humanitarian emergencies.  This, in turn, has impacted on the manner in which 
Western and African societies (differently) approach the management and resolution 
of conflicts on the African continent.   
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In this regard, ECOWAS’s experiences West Africa have been hailed as a 
landmark to the new shape of international peace missions in the post-Cold War 
period.67  True, ECOWAS’s real motives for intervening are often questioned, but 
the organisations endeavours are nonetheless regarded as possibly the first sign of 
Africa changing its traditional stance towards intervention, from non-intervention in 
the affairs of other states towards interference in the face of human tragedy. 
5.1 The ECOMOG experience: a revolution in inter-African affairs 
 The first signs of Africa overturning its traditional reluctance to approve of 
intervention in the internal affairs of its member states was demonstrated when the 
Monitoring Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) intervened in Liberia (1991) and in 
Sierra Leone (1993).68  Both countries were embroiled in bloody civil wars 
characterised by widespread atrocities, human rights violations and sheer human 
misery on a scale never witnessed before in Africa, and there also appears to have 
been a total disregard for international conventions and civilised conduct of war. A 
variety of contending explanations have been put forward by scholars69 when 
examining ECOMOG’s reasons for intervening – among them for humanitarian 
reasons – although the validity of this particular motive is questionable. 
Nonetheless, ECOMOG’s endeavours in West Africa can be viewed as a 
major evolution in inter-African affairs for a number of reasons.  Firstly, West 
Africa presented the first example of a sub-regional organisation that intervened 
military in the domestic affairs of member states at different times in the 
1990s.Secondly, the decision to intervene undermined the basic tenets (i.e. the 
respect of sovereignty and the principle of non-interference) that have guiding 
relations among many Africa’s political leaders since the creation of the OAU.70  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the ECOMOG operations set a very 
important precedent in that they demonstrated that intervention forces force could be 
mounted without the prior approval of the UN.  The two operations were in fact not 
directly sanctioned by the UN, although they did receive retroactive approval.71   
This last point comes as no real surprise since ECOWAS’s Protocol Relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
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and Security72 (the ‘Protocol’) does not explicitly call for prior UN approval for 
humanitarian actions.  In cases of internal conflict that may trigger a humanitarian 
disaster, and where serious violations of human rights may occur, Article 27 of the 
Protocol only states that ECOWAS ‘shall submit a report on the situation to the 
Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations’,73 while Article 52 merely 
affirms that ECOWAS ‘shall inform the United Nations of any military intervention 
undertaken in pursuit of the objectives of ECOWAS’.74   
It is perhaps because of ECOWAS’s singular stance and relative success in 
ending humanitarian disaster in both Liberia and Sierra Leone (as opposed to the UN 
which, at that stage, seemed generally unwilling to act even in the face of grave 
human atrocities), that inspired African Heads of State and Government to embrace 
a distinctly African approach to conflict prevention, management, and resolution by 
adopting the Constitutive Act of the AU in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000.75 
5.2 The African Union’s Constitutive Act: asserting Africa’s own priorities  
Africa’s traditional posture of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
states was largely overturned with the establishment of the AU.  Indeed, the 
Constitutive Act of the AU allows for intervention without the consent of the target 
state in a way that the former Organisation of the Africa Union (OAU) never did.  
Article 3 of the OAU Charter76 states, amongst other principles, the strict adherence 
to 
the sovereignty equality of all member states; non-interference in 
the internal affairs of States; respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of each state; and for its inalienable right to 
independent existence.77 
In stark contrast, Article 4(h) of the AU provides for the right to of 
the African Union intervene in a Member State [in] respect of 
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grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity[.]78 
The AU’s act also provides much leeway in the criteria for intervention in as 
much as Articles 4(m), 4(o), and 4 (p) respectively provide for the respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance;  respect 
for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection, acts of terrorism and 
subversive activities; and condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
government.79 
Although it may be true that African leaders have generally been slow to 
ratify many treaties and protocols, and have often lacked the necessary political will 
to undertake what they have committed themselves to do, this position taken by the 
member states of AU is nonetheless important for a number of reasons.    
First of all, the AU Act is the first international treaty to recognise the right 
to intervene for humanitarian purposes.80  Secondly, it reflects a growing recognition 
that the principle of sovereignty cannot, and should not, be used as a barrier by 
which oppressive leaders may continue to abuse their people.81  Thirdly, if leaders 
are held responsible of abusing their people, intervention will be considered as a 
means to end violence and restore peace.  Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, it 
appears as if Africa (at least on paper) is defining and asserting its own priorities.  In 
this regard, the AU Act seems unclear with regards to prior UN authorisation for 
intervention.  Certainly, African leaders should ideally seek initial UN approval for 
intervening. But the AU, compared to its predecessor, has undoubtedly struck a 
somewhat unique relationship with the UN, especially since it appears that the 
organisation, at this stage, has sufficient leeway to sanction intervention missions on 
the African continent.   
6. Towards a new co-operative framework between the AU and the UN 
Article 24(1) of the UN Charter specifically confers on the UN Security 
Council ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’.82  Unfortunately, international realities dictate that the UN cannot address 
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every potential and actual conflict troubling the world,83 while, at the same time, 
regional organisations such as the AU often operate with starved resources and have 
limited capacity to provide security.84  Two solutions that might help overcoming 
these international realities and regional shortcomings are subsequently proposed. 
6.1 The ‘layered response’ system 
Both Vraalsen, Cilliers and Sturman propose that a ‘layered response’ 
system is an effective mechanism to overcome the difficulties faced by international 
and regional organisations when dealing with conflicts.85  In essence, this system 
favours local and regional responses to a problem before the UN Security Council 
becomes involved. Although this would practically mean a dilution of the central 
role many had hoped that the UN would play in peace missions world-wide, the 
layered response system is envisioned in optimising the use of available resources.  
In other words, should local resources prove insufficient, then the next layer is 
responsible for providing the necessary means and material to effectively respond to 
any serious crises.   
In Africa’s case, the AU is the ideal regional body to respond to conflicts 
anywhere on the African continent.  In the same way, sub-regional organisations like 
SADC and ECOWAS are ideal to respond to more locally-based conflicts.  In sum, 
these organisations should be viewed as important links in the chain of a layered 
response, and, depending on their particular mandates, have specific but related 
responsibilities.  
Unfortunately, the track record of the AU’s predecessor, the OAU, has not 
been impressive in either preventing, managing, or resolving African conflicts.  
Caught in its perennial dilemma of wanting to promote peace in cases of civil war, 
the OAU has almost without exception been a defender of the status quo, mainly in 
terms of national boundaries, of how various countries are structured, and of 
political leadership.  These positions, although understandable, have severely limited 
the opportunities to protect people living in states guilty of violating the rights of 
millions of individuals.86  Sure, the AU’s position on intervention challenges 
Africa’s traditional (negative) posture towards intervention, but is also true that the 
realities of African politics dictate a more meaningful search for measures to 
enhance the competence of the AU in either initiating, participating, or be willing to 
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conduct humanitarian intervention operations – or any other type of peace mission 
for that matter.   
Present international norms on the allowance of intervention further 
complicate this possibility.  In terms of the UN Charter, any (sub) regional 
organisation that intends to undertake any intervention actions, must seek the prior 
authorisation of the UN Security Council.  The principles of most regional 
organisations reflect this approach.  But what happens if the UN Security Council is 
unwilling or unable to authorise appropriate action in a timely manner as happened 
in the case of Rwanda?   
As already mentioned, the act establishing the AU is not clear in this regard, 
leaving sufficient leeway for the AU to sanction intervention without prior UN 
Security Council approval.87  At the same time, the UN has been almost blind in 
assuming the supremacy of the principle of non-interference and has, therefore, 
proved willing to authorise intervention in humanitarian crises only where the 
consent of the major parties to such conflicts has been obtained.88  Abidance to this 
principle has led to inaction.  In such circumstances, contemporary crises in Africa 
involving human atrocities have challenged the quality of ‘consent’ as a prerequisite 
for meaningful intervention.89  Perhaps it is time that the strict abidance to this rule 
is re-considered. 
6.2 Ex-post facto approval 
Keeping in mind that the UN should unquestionably continue to play a 
central role with regard to peace initiatives in Africa,90 it has been argued the AU is 
morally and legally obliged to do everything it can do to muster forces from its own 
resources to prevent the recurrence of international inaction – even if this may entail 
turning a blind eye in the face of UN authority.91  Although one would assume that 
the AU or other regional organisations would not easily embark upon intervention 
without a mandate from the UN Security Council, it may be necessary to adopt a 
more versatile and flexible approach once certain conditions with regard to human 
suffering are reached. 
A viable solution to the problem of UN inaction was proposed in October 
2001 by the Washington DC-based Fund for Peace through its Programme on 
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Regional Responses to Internal War.92  One of its reports, namely African 
Perspectives on Military Intervention, suggests that although the UN Security 
Council is the preferred authorising body for intervention, these missions may be 
authorised by the AU or other sub-regional organisation in emergencies in which 
urgent action is needed, but the UN Security Council must be informed and ex post 
facto approval must be sought.  Sub-regional organisations must likewise inform and 
seek approval from the AU.93   
Against this background, it would appear that (sub) regional role-players in 
Africa may be compelled to play a more pro-active role in upholding security and 
defending peace on the continent.  This is, of course, of special significance for 
South Africa, generally perceived as a regional power in Southern Africa and on the 
continent.  The last section of the paper, therefore, will examine whether South 
Africa has the capacity to positively contribute in enforcing peace missions on the 
African continent – if necessary, with a view to resolving current and future 
conflicts through decisive interventions. 
7. South Africa’s role in promoting Africa’s intervention posture  
South Africa’s role in the promotion of security and the sustainability of 
peace on the continent is generally regarded as being invaluable with regards to the 
well being and future of Southern Africa, and Africa in general.  Pretoria views the 
plethora of wars on the African continent as ‘anathema’ to the notion of an African 
Renaissance.94  Ending these conflicts on the continent, therefore, is considered as 
one of the more important goals of South Africa’s foreign policy.  Official 
government documents such as the 1996 White Paper on Defence95 and the 1998 
Defence Review,96 clearly link peace and stability on the continent to the country’s 
national interest.  
With regard to intervention, and peace operations in general, Chapter 4 of the 
White Paper on Defence and Chapter 5 of the Defence Review strictly articulate that 
such missions ought to take place under the auspices of the (former) OAU or SADC, 
and that they require prior endorsement by the UN Security Council.  Likewise, 
Article 11 of SADC’s political and security ‘leg’, the Organ on Politics, Defence and 
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Security, clearly asserts that SADC ‘shall resort to [peace] enforcement only with 
the authorisation of the UN Security Council’.97  In all fairness, these conditions do 
reaffirm their commitment to the principles in the UN Charter, but they certainly do 
not reflect the current and more flexible approach offered by the AU’s Constitutive 
Act.  Now that the AU has been adopted, the question that should be asked is 
whether the South African government, as well as other SADC member states, are 
willing to re-consider their posture on intervention.   
Considering South Africa’s growing global profile, many regional and 
international actors expect the country to play a prominent role in overturning the 
current (unstable) state of affairs in and beyond SADC territory.  Indeed, there are 
few countries like South Africa that have the resources and the operational 
capabilities to maintain enforcement missions for any length of time on the African 
continent.98  Thus, if one considers that humanitarian intervention might emerge as 
one amongst other issues that could positively contribute to the management, and 
perhaps even the prevention, of conflict – as this study has attempted to demonstrate 
– it is proposed that South Africa has important responsibilities to promote a more 
positive attitude towards humanitarian intervention.   
As regional ‘superpower’, it could be argued that South Africa should take a 
tougher stand than it presently is in averting inaction in the face of large-scale 
human suffering.  Preventive diplomacy,99 which appears to lie at the very heart of 
South Africa’s regional policy, has by enlarge failed to achieve its desired objective 
of supporting peace and democracy and ending human suffering, particularly in the 
cases of Angola, the DRC, and Zimbabwe.  Internationally, South Africa has the 
responsibility of promoting the AU’s current position regarding intervention based 
on humanitarian grounds.  Of course, this would entail a re-think of Pretoria’s own 
position towards the allowance of humanitarian intervention operations in Southern 
Africa.  In the long term, South Africa should take the lead in pressurising 
international leaders to adopt a new legal framework regarding intervention similar 
to the one proposed by the Programme on Regional Responses to Internal War i.e. 
that intervention may be authorised by (sub) regional organisations in emergencies 
in which urgent action is needed, in cases, of course, when the UN and powerful 
states appear to be unwilling or incapable of acting.  
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In view of the above, and to overcome international realties and regional 
shortcomings, South Africa may emerge as a vital link in the chain of a ‘layered 
response’ system between the UN, the AU, and SADC.  However, because no 
African state has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, interventions by 
African regional and sub-regional organisations would almost always be subjected 
to international scrutiny, and the great powers will always have a key role in 
deciding on interventions.  South Africa has, at least by implication, stated its 
aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.100  If this 
aspiration ever materialised, the more powerful states would possibly have less of a 
chance blocking smaller powers from intervening or nullifying the existence of a 
humanitarian crisis.  Unfortunately, because the opposite is true, it is not hard to 
appreciate the AU’s (perhaps audacious) provisions regarding the criteria and 
authorisation of interventions.  Given the reluctance of many Western powers to 
engage in peace missions, gaining an African permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council, therefore, may prove highly valuable.  
Conclusion 
In the course of reviewing all the factors discussed in the paper, several 
important issues have arisen from the discussion. Firstly, individuals have a right to 
receive humanitarian assistance. Secondly, because the Westphalian system of state 
sovereignty appears to be disintegrating particularly in Africa’s case, intervention 
missions may not necessarily take place within the context of a system of sovereign 
states controlled by legitimate and internationally accepted leaders.  Thirdly, no state 
should be allowed to invoke the principle of sovereignty when accused of serious 
human rights law and humanitarian law violations.  Fourthly, because a state’s very 
existence rests on its authority, the presiding authorities cannot be considered 
legitimate once control is lost over their armed forces.  Fifthly, the very nature of 
expected conflict favours humanitarian intervention as a preventative or coercive 
response.  
All these conditions have convinced a number of academics and 
international leaders alike that the internal affairs of states have now become a more 
important component of the present international system.  In considering the paper’s 
arguments, it is proposed that bypassing the sovereign rights of a state, if 
sovereignty is used as protection behind which predatory governments can hide 
abuse of their peoples, is morally justifiable.  Surely, avoiding intervention on this 
premises is un-justifiable.  Certainly, a system whereby the dignity and 
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independence of states is practised, without the misuse of sovereign rights, cannot 
accept intervention as a means to solve threats to human security, if any.  Africa has 
not (yet) reached this stage of political development, and hence it could be argued 
that humanitarian intervention in Africa might be needed where a weak state is 
unable to protect its citizens, as well as when a repressive state is unwilling to do so 
or it is itself the cause of abuse.   
In this regard, the intention recently expressed by the AU in its Constitutive 
Act – in terms of not tolerating abusive governments that hide behind the ‘barriers’ 
of sovereignty – can be recognised as a huge step forward and a positive opportunity 
for a reversal of negative perceptions regarding the usefulness of intervention in 
contemporary world politics.  Significantly, the AU’s Act is the first international 
treaty to have recognised the right to intervene for humanitarian purposes.  For all 
intents and purposes, it appears that Africa may well be on the frontline of the 
intervention challenge, and that the continent is now at the vanguard of international 
thinking on these issues.   
It cannot be overly stressed, however, that any significant movement for 
Africa in search for regional peace depends, above all, upon the political will of 
African states.  In this respect, recent decisions to agree upon certain rules and 
procedures that do not tolerate human suffering occurring within the confines of a 
state give grounds for cautious optimism.  True, humanitarian intervention should in 
most cases be regarded as an action of last resort; but if conducted in a legitimate 
way it could positively contribute to the management and resolution of violence on 
the African continent. 
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